BIOTRONIK Statement on the Cybersecurity Updates Affecting Medtronic Implantable Cardiac Device Programmers
On October 11, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a Safety Communication regarding cybersecurity updates affecting Medtronic implantable cardiac device programmers, based on an NCCIC Advisory.1 According to the FDA’s communication, Medtronic is issuing a software update to address a safety risk caused by cybersecurity vulnerabilities associated with the internet connection in two models of programmers used to download software from the manufacturer’s software distribution network (SDN). Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities would allow an adversary to influence this communication and respond with malicious updates to the programmer software that could change a programmer’s functionality or a connected implantable device.2
The FDA’s Safety Communication refers to several vulnerabilities in Medtronic’s implantable cardiac device programmers. None of BIOTRONIK’s devices, programmers or networks are affected by these cybersecurity vulnerabilities or the corrective measures that have been subsequently taken. Neither are any corrective measures necessary for BIOTRONIK’s devices.
BIOTRONIK Renamic programmers use certificate-based mutual authentication to establish a VPN tunnel. Prior to downloading new programmer software, the Renamic device verifies that it is still connected to the authenticated server.
The Renamic programmer recognizes and rejects illegitimate software update files. The files used to update BIOTRONIK Renamic programmers use a digital signature to ensure authenticity and integrity of the software update. These update files are transferred via a secure HTTPS connection to the programmer device. Moreover, BIOTRONIK’s remote programmer software update system is not based on commercial off-the-shelf software with known vulnerabilities. Together, these design elements strengthen the programmer against vulnerabilities that allow unauthorized changes in programmer functionality.
Safety is paramount to the design and production of all BIOTRONIK devices and is at the center of everything we do. As part of its established cybersecurity processes, BIOTRONIK continuously analyzes external reports and assesses device security. BIOTRONIK takes these additional steps to ensure the safety and efficacy of all of its systems.
References:
1. Advisory ICSMA-18-058-01, Medtronic 2090 Carelink Programmer Vulnerabilities (Update B), Original release date: February 27, 2018 | Last revised: October 11, 2018, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-058-01
2. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Cybersecurity Updates Affecting Medtronic Implantable Cardiac Device Programmers: FDA Safety Communication, October 11, 2018, https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm623184.htm?utm_campaign=Cybersecurity%20 Updates%20-%20Medtronic&ut%E2%80%A6
More Statements
-
Image
StatementBIOTRONIK Statement on the Log4Shell Vulnerability
The discovery of a high-severity vulnerability known as Log4Shell was disclosed publicly on December 9, 2021, while a related lower-severity vulnerability was disclosed on December 14, 2021. These vulnerabilities are present in a software library used by many servers worldwide (see Background for details). In light of this recent discovery, BIOTRONIK has carefully analyzed all of its provided services. The analysis concluded that the conditions for exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability and the related CVE-2021-45046 and CVE-2021-45105 vulnerabilities do not exist in any of BIOTRONIK’s
-
Image
StatementBIOTRONIK Statement on CardioMessenger II Cybersecurity
CardioMessenger devices form an essential part of BIOTRONIK’s remote monitoring system, enabling the secure transmission of critical patient and device data to the treating physician. As the company that pioneered remote monitoring, we have taken cybersecurity design seriously since 2001. It is integrated into our quality management system, all relevant business processes and prioritized at every step of the product life cycle. Our cardiac implants do not accept programming modifications or commands via any form of long-distance communication. By design, it is technically impossible to
-
Image
StatementBIOTRONIK Statement on “SweynTooth” Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
The US Food and Drug Administration has issued a Safety Communication regarding a family of cybersecurity vulnerabilities known as SweynTooth, which may introduce risks for certain medical devices that use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) wireless communication technology. If exploited, these vulnerabilities can allow unauthorized users to potentially cause a device to stop working, stop it from working correctly and/or bypass security to access certain device functions. The FDA has said it is not aware of any confirmed adverse events related to these vulnerabilities although software to exploit
-
Image
BIOTRONIK Statement on the FDA’s Safety Communication “URGENT/11”
On October 1, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a Safety Communication regarding a set of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, referred to as “Urgent/11” that — if exploited by a remote attacker — may introduce risks for medical devices and hospital networks. According to the communication: “These vulnerabilities may allow anyone to remotely take control of the medical device and change its function, cause denial of service, or cause information leaks or logical flaws, which may prevent device function.” These vulnerabilities exist in a third-party software component known as IPnet
-
Image
StatementBIOTRONIK Statement on the Publication ‘Security Testing of the Pacemaker Ecosystem’
The work ‘Security Testing of the Pacemaker Ecosystem’ was recently published as a master’s thesis, authored by Mr. Anders Been Wilhelmsen and Mr. Eivind Skjelmo Kristiansen. This publication investigates the state of cybersecurity of BIOTRONIK’s ICS 3000 – a programmer for BIOTRONIK implantable cardiac pacemakers, defibrillators and monitors that is used by healthcare professionals during the implantation procedure and follow-ups. ICS 3000 programmers were distributed between 2001 and 2012. In the publication, the authors report about several cybersecurity weaknesses such as: The central
-
Image
StatementBIOTRONIK Statement on the Medical Advisory and Safety Communication Regarding Medtronic’s Conexus Radio Frequency Telemetry Protocol
The Department of Homeland Security and the US FDA have issued a Medical Advisory and Safety Communication respectively describing two types of cybersecurity vulnerabilities affecting multiple Medtronic devices that utilize the Conexus telemetry protocol. BIOTRONIK utilizes substantially different protocols for both the clinical and the home environment. Moreover, by design, the remote communication system via BIOTRONIK Home Monitoring® does not have the functionality to transmit or alter therapeutic commands to the implant.
-
Image
StatementStatement on the Cybersecurity of BIOTRONIK Solutions Following WIRED Magazine’s Article on Vulnerabilities in Pacemaker Programmer Systems
On August 9, WIRED magazine reported that researchers discovered cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the way pacemaker programmers connected to the software delivery network of a specified manufacturer. The researchers claim that “digital code signing”—the cryptographic validation of the legitimacy and integrity of software—is lacking in the manufacturer’s infrastructure, allowing an attacker to potentially take control of device programmers through malicious updates that can subsequently be spread to implanted pacemakers. 1 None of BIOTRONIK’s devices, programmers or networks are affected by